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While it is recognised that there must be segregation between corporate and process control networks in order 
to achieve a higher level of security, there is evidence that this is not occurring. Computer and network 
vulnerability assessments were carried out on three Australian critical infrastructure providers to determine 
their level of security. The security measures implemented by each organisation have been mapped against best 
practice recommendations for achieving segregation between process control and corporate networks. One of 
the organisations used a model which provided a dedicated information security team for provision of security 
for the process control networks. One of the other organisations relied heavily on outsourcing for their IT 
security, and a third used in house corporate IT for their process control security. It was found that the 
organisation using a dedicated IT security team that worked within the process control group achieved the 
highest level of security when mapped to best practice. This paper concludes that best practice 
recommendations for critical infrastructure providers should also include guidelines for the organisational 
structure, and further, that dedicated IT security personnel be placed within the process control group.  
 





Process control systems (PCS), of which supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are a 
subset, are used by critical infrastructure operators to regulate and manage the operation of critical systems such 
as power, water and gas. In addition, these systems control everything from traffic lights through to large scale 
refineries and mining operations. All critical infrastructure providers also rely upon these systems for safety and 
reliability, through continuous monitoring and operation. These systems were originally designed around 
reliability and safety, and if they were network connected they were connected on isolated internal networks for 
the purposes of control and management; essentially a closed system. Typically in these situations security was 
not a consideration due to the isolated nature of the systems and their closed nature. It should be remembered 
that these systems were implemented also in an era when computing and information technology will also 
largely conducted in isolated installations or laboratories around the globe (Stouffer et al, 2008). 
 
With advances in technology, we are becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent on these 
connections for the full functioning of modern society.  One of the main conduits and enablers for this has been 
the rapid expansion of the Internet. Correspondingly, as a result of the growth of the Internet there has been a 
convergence on the TCP/IP protocol suite as the dominant network protocol for business and industry 
(Steenstrup, 2010). This has seen many hardware and software vendors, including SCADA vendors, align their 
products with this kind of reality (Igure et al, 2006).  
 
The increased interconnection of SCADA systems to corporate networks is a significant threat in itself, enabling 
and making them accessible to undesirable entities. Be it directed attacks, opportunistic scanning or malfeasant 
insiders (Jackson-Higgins, 2007), these once stand-alone systems are now vulnerable to a range of new attack 
vectors. While insider malfeasance may only account for some 20% of attacks against a system, the percentage 
of the costs related to insider attacks is nearer to 80% (Baker et al, 2009). The most infamous of the intentional 
insider attacks against a critical infrastructure provider is the case of Maroochydore shire. Their SCADA system 
was attacked by a person who had been employed to install the system after a request for employment was 
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turned down (Smith, 2001). The attacker stole a laptop when he left which contained all of the tools and codes 
required to remotely operate the control system, and it took some time for the operators to locate the source of 
the issues he was causing. Additionally, most security measures are outward facing, and are not intended to 
detect against insider malfeasance. Insider attack must be a significant concern for CIPs, and gives further 
weight to the need for internal segregation between control system and corporate networks.  
 
The research reported in this paper was based on the examination of a number of case studies conducted under 
the Federal Governments computer and network vulnerability assessment (CNVA) program. The CNVA 
program is an Australian Government grants scheme developed to help ensure the security of Australia’s critical 
infrastructure (TISN 2008).  
 
RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICE FOR SECURING SCADA 
 
This paper drew on a range of literature in order to create a composite, best practice list of features and 
strategies for securing process control systems, and as a guideline for measuring the compliance of an 
organisation against the organisational model. The first piece of literature used for this purpose is the NIST 
Guide to industrial control system security (Stouffer et al, 2008). This guide was produced by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a United States Government Organisation, and the guide itself is 
put forward as recommended best practice by US-CERT. In addition to using the NIST guide as a reference 
point for determining effectiveness of the organisational structure, a range of other network security best 
practice measures have also been used including ANSI/ISA-TR99.00.01-2007 Security Technologies for 
Industrial Automation and Control Systems (ISA, 2007), Idaho National Labs Control Systems Cyber Security – 
Defense in Depth Guide (INL, 2006). 
 
 
Table 1: Common methodology used to assess the three organisations. Multiple other methods used for other CNVAs, 
components of assessment all align with NIST best practice. 
 
Category Specific Measures 
Firewall External 
 Multiple  
 Multiple (different vendors) 
 Firewall rule sets configured correctly 
 Firewall OS / firmware patched? 
Network Segregation DMZ between corporate and PCS 
 DMZ between Internet and Corporate 
 Logical segregation through VLANs and subnets 
 Access Control lists on border routers 
 Intrusion Detection 
Remote Access Secure authentication method 
 Two factor authentication 
 RSA token authentication 
Documentation Policies current 
 Policy audited or enforced? 
 Network topology diagrams current 




ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE TYPES 
 
The structure of the three organisations in terms of their positioning of information security management, or 
provision of IT security services is given in figure 1. The structure represented as organisation 1 had a dedicated 
Information Security Manager as well as system administrators responsible for the security and operation of the 




















































Figure 1: Three different organisational models of placement of the information security (IS) team placement relative to 
SCADA / process control systems. (a) This organisation has a dedicated IS team in the SCADA section of the organisational 
SCADA / Process control system Corporate 
Information 
Information Technology 
Corporate SCADA / Process control system 
Information Information 
Information Technology Information Technology 





model in addition to the corporate IS team. (b) This organisation has no dedicated in house SCADA based IS team, and 
relies upon the corporate IS team to provide IT security for their control system infrastructure. (c) Organisation three out 
sources it’s IT systems to a third party, but does still retain a corporate IS manager. 
 
REPORTED ISSUES FROM THE CNVA CASE STUDIES 
 
After establishing a baseline for what security measures a CIP should have in place, results of vulnerability 
assessments carried out on Australian CIPs was then examined. The organisations represented here were 
participants in a computer and network vulnerability assessment, a national program supported by the Australian 
Federal Government. The three organisations used for this paper were chosen as they were assessed using a 
common methodology, and given that other variables are not controlled, it is hoped that their relative overall 
security level should be comparable, The generic security issues found in the Australian CNVAs conducted 




All cases had significant issues with effective governance of the critical infrastructure assets. In this case we 
mean the assets to be both the corporate and SCADA networks of the organisations the authors examined. All 
organisations demonstrated poor delineation of corporate ownership and responsibility for the SCADA networks 




As a result of poor governance structures within the organisations the policy structures also suffered. There was 
little evidence of any policy review, enforcement, auditing or existence of any policy implementation. Review 
of the policy documentation that was presented during the assessments revealed it was rarely current and was 
lacking in relevant details. The policy in some instances had not been reviewed or revised for several years. In 
some cases where there was the existence of a policy there existed approved procedures which were in direct 
contravention to the existing policy. 
 
Un-Patched Hardware and Software 
 
All of the assessments conducted found exploitable vulnerability as a result of un-patched hardware and 
software issues. Of particular concern were perimeter firewalls that had multiple exploitable vulnerabilities as a 
result of dilettante patching regimes. These firewall exploits were well known and had been known in the 
security community for up to five years. Due to the legacy nature of SCADA systems, all of the underlying 
supporting computer operating systems had significant vulnerability. Most of the operating systems examined in 
all assessments had long since reached end of life, and were no longer supported by the vendor. Most of the 
supporting applications in the form of SQL servers, network operating systems or specific SCADA applications 
were likewise no longer supported by the vendor. 
 
Lack of Network Segregation and Segmentation 
 
Assessments conducted so far have revealed networks that are severely compromised under the defence in-depth 
strategy. Several of the network architectures were based on flat 10.0.0.0/8 networks allowing for a reversal of 
the entire network including corporate and control systems. Penetration of perimeter controls would have 
allowed complete sight into the enterprises examined. This would allow the easy implantation of malcode such 
as packet sniffers or keystroke analysers into the network architectures. 
 
Lack of Sound Authentication Mechanisms 
 
Several of the installations provided generic logins to staff members for example username equals staff 
password equals staff. All of the systems reviewed had no reliable or monitored audit trial for systems access. 
That is no coordinated logging of even simple statistics such as logon or log off was conducted. These logins 
were provided mainly for expediency and were handed out typically as a result of the work environment trusting 
individuals. Given that 60 to 80% of losses sustained by successful I T. enabled crime or malfeasance is 
committed by insiders (Richardson, 2008), one could postulate this is an extremely unwise move on the part of 
management. Furthermore, some of the generic accounts uncovered in the examinations had root or admin level 
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access to the entire IT infrastructure. This would allow any malicious individual the power to corrupt absolutely. 
The use of such simple and group based passwords also allows a substantial vector for the disgruntled employee 
to penetrate the system and wreak havoc with impunity. 
 
Monitoring, logging, auditing 
 
There was a complete lack of any substantive logging of network interactions with attendant monitoring and 
then subsequent auditing and review. This observation put all organisations in an invidious position with respect 
to the network based exploit and attack. This leads to the realisation that most of the organisations had no ability 
to answer fundamental questions such as have we been attacked? We got hacked – how did it happen? Inability 
to answer even these basic questions makes amelioration or reduction of any network borne threat a relatively 
impossible task. 
 
In one organisation there was a logging of firewall connections but no actual review of these logs to determine 
any emergent threat, unauthorised connections or internal malfeasant activity. The net value of this type of 
logging is a completely negative proposition for the organisation. The organisation is wasting money logging 
data that was never intended to be examined. 
 
It has been proven already due to the nature of SCADA systems that the use of intrusion detection systems and 
intrusion prevention systems can shutdown communications, which can have potentially catastrophic 
unintended consequences (Fink et al, 2006). If we cannot reliably implement and use intrusion detection 
systems or intrusion prevention systems to protect networks that run SCADA devices, the use of monitoring 
logging and auditing are fundamental tools and techniques in providing response against network based attack. 
In some cases the use of these is the first and last line of defence against attacks that would be perpetrated 
against networks. 
 
COMPARISON OF ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AGAINST SECURITY 
MEASURES 
 
The results of the CNVA audits were genericised and summarised according to the criterion given in Table 1. 
These results were then categorised according to the organisation type as given in Figure 1, and ranked for their 
overall security posture. As can be seen in Table 2, Organisation 1 had a greater overall level of security than 
did the other organisation types. Whilst the majority of the measures are quite technical in nature, even issues 





Table 2: Evaluation of security audit results against a common best practice framework  
for three different organisational structures. 
Criteria Organisation 1 Organisation 2 Organisation 3 
Firewalls    
External  Yes Yes  Yes 
Multiple firewalls Yes No Yes 
Multiple Firewalls (different vendors) Yes N/A Yes 
Firewall rule sets configured correctly Yes No N/A 
Firewall OS / firmware patched? Yes No No 
Network Segregation Measures    
DMZ between corporate and PCS Yes No No 
DMZ between Internet and Corporate Yes No No 
Logical segregation through subnets and VLANs Yes No No 
Access control lists on border routers Yes No No 
Intrusion Detection System Yes N/A N/A 
Remote Access    
Secure authentication method Yes Yes Yes 
Two factor authentication Yes No No 
RSA token authentication Yes No No 
Documentation     
Policies Current? No No No 
Network topology diagrams current? Yes No No 
Firewall and Access control rules available? Yes Yes No 
Policy audited or enforced? Yes No No 
 
The columns where an N/A is recorded were due to a number of factors. In some cases, it was due to the 
measure not having been implemented e.g. Organisation 2 did not have multiple firewalls at the boundary 
between corporate and the internet. Other N/A results were recorded because the outsourcing provider did 





The results presented here overwhelmingly support the notion that having dedicated information security and 
technology embedded within the process control division of a critical infrastructure provider leads to the best 
security outcome. However, it must be noted that this was an examination of four organisations, categorised into 
three types, and that it did not examine budgets or other factors which may have influenced this outcome. 
 
The NIST Guide to industrial control systems security does discuss the formation of a team which consists of 
people from key stakeholders within an organisation, but the evidence presented here would seem to indicate 
that this does not go far enough. The NIST guide states that the IT department of an organisation can have vital 
input to protecting a process control network. In isolation, there is nothing wrong with this statement, but the 
reality is that IT departments do not have sufficient ownership of the process control systems, and as such there 
is a disconnect when it comes to protecting these systems i.e. the role of an IT security group, which is based in 
the corporate is to protect the corporate network. This is not a criticism, but simply a statement of their job 
purpose, and for this group to ignore their raison d’être would be negligent. There is then a paradox created 
when a group dedicated to protecting one part of an organisation is asked to assist in protecting an area which 
they do not have a direct interest in, and are then criticised when they do not give it their full attention. It is 
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likely for this reason that those organisations using this model in order to provide IT security input for 
protecting their process control networks were observed to have a level of security which was inadequate when 
compared against the best practice guidelines.  
 
Whilst it could be appropriately argued that the security issues found with organisations two and three may not 
be as a direct result of the organisational structure, there is certainly a case to support the structure of 
organisation one as being best practice. Noted in the assessments conducted on these organisations was a 
combination of lack of governance and or direct responsibility for the SCADA / control system. The result of 
this lack of responsibility was that the corporate or third party IT support groups had no direct ownership in 
these systems. As a flow on effect, this lack of ownership meant that there was a corresponding lack of 
understanding of the criticality of securing these systems from attack, and that the focus of their concerns from a 
security perspective was the computers on the corporate network segments.  
 
Alternatively, some groups would argue that critical infrastructure protection (CIP) should be an organisation 
wide responsibility, and that there should not be a dedicated security team responsible for it. The NIST 
guidelines suggest that a dedicated team made up from all areas of the organisation should be responsible for 
securing CIP (Stouffer, 2008). Additionally, there are Gartner Reports suggesting that operational technology 
(OT) and information technology governance need to be converged (Roberts & Steenstrup, 2010). However, this 
paper paid more heed to business needs, with security a secondary consideration. Unfortunately, when the 
consequence of a security breach is loss of critical infrastructure, potentially for an extended period of time, 
security of the OT must take precedence. The reality, as found by examining the security of these organisations 
as reported here, is that a corporate IT security manager or agent is always going to put the corporate network 
first: it is the nature of the beast. 
 
A recent report from Gartner highlighted the issue of where the information security officer should be located 
within a critical infrastructure provider: 
 
“Coordination and leadership for OT security is vital. To date, a chief information security officer 
(CISO) equivalent for OT security does not exist in most utilities, though a few innovators have already 
taken early steps in this area.” – Perkins (2009) 
 
The evidence presented in this paper supports the preceding statement, given that only organisation 1 had a 
CISO equivalent in the OT structure of the organisation. The other organisations reviewed in the CNVA relied 
up on using the CISO from the corporate segment of the overall organisational structure. 
 
The evidence presented in this paper would suggest that the structure of organisation where there are 
information security and technology personnel embedded in the control system structure of the organisation, and 





Whilst there are arguments that CIP security is an organisational wide responsibility, the evidence presented in 
this paper suggests that the implementation of security needs to be based in the process control section of an 
organisation. Organisations that rely on in house corporate information security or information technology to 
provide security for their process control networks are not adequately protecting their SCADA / process control 
systems. Those organisations using a model which has IS / IT specialists working as part of the control system 
team achieved a higher level of security than those which did not follow this model. The reports supporting 
convergence do so from a management point of view, and not from a security perspective. As evidenced by the 
assessments carried out and presented here, this approach does not appear to be working, as security managed 
from the corporate side of the organisation was not adequate. The evidence presented here suggests that 
convergence does not lead to the best security outcomes, and that it is dangerous to impose a standard business 
governance model onto critical infrastructure providers. 
 
One area not investigated here was the relationship between budget allocated to each section, and the impact this 
may have had on the security posture of the organisations that were examined as part of the CNVA process. It 
may be that budgetary restrictions had a role to play in any observed security issues, and this will need to be 




Further research in this area will examine a wider range of organisations to examine their level of security and to 
see whether this apparent connection between organisational structure and security level holds true across a 
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